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Patent Transfer And The Bundle of Sticks
by Andrew C. Michaels*
Abstract
In the age of the patent troll, patents are often licensed and transferred. A
transferred patent may have been subject to multiple complex license agreements.
It cannot be that such a transfer wipes the patent clean of all outstanding license
agreements; the licensee must keep the license. But at the same time, it cannot be
that the patent transferee becomes a party to a complex and sweeping license
agreement – the contract – merely by virtue of acquiring one patent. This article
attempts to separate the in personam aspects of a license agreement from its effects
on the underlying in rem patent rights, using Hohfeld’s framework of jural relations
and the “bundle of sticks” conception of property. A license agreement can diminish
(but not add to) the bundle of in rem patent rights initially granted by the USPTO,
and a new patent owner takes only the diminished bundle of rights upon transfer,
given that one cannot transfer more than what one owns. The bundle theory can
provide greater clarity regarding the extent to which licenses “run with the patent,”
and also has implications for how patent transfer affects other doctrines such as
patent exhaustion, FRAND obligations, prior user rights, and laches.
Keywords
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Patent Transfer And The Bundle of Sticks
Introduction
No figure in contemporary patent law has drawn more ire than the “patent
troll.”1 The bête noire of the patent law community, the so-called troll might be
more formerly referred to as a “Non Practicing Entity” (NPE) or “Patent Assertion
Entity” (PAE).2 The troll lies in wait under technological bridges, until it emerges
threatening to cast corporations into a cascade of patent litigation. But the troll can
be persuaded to step aside, to grant a license, for a price.
The License on Transfer (“LOT”) Network bills itself as the “permanent
solution to the patent troll problem,”3 something like the fabled big billy goat.4 The

See, e.g., Kristen Jakobsen Osenga, Formerly Manufacturing Entities: Piercing the
Patent Troll Rhetoric, 47 CONN. L. REV. 435, 437 (2014) (“Everyone seems to hate
‘patent trolls.’”); but see, Edward Lee, Patent Trolls: Moral Panics, Motions in Limine,
and Patent Reform, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 101, 101 (2016) (“‘I like patent trolls,’
Judge Richard Posner confessed to a group of patent scholars . . . .”).
1

Osenga, 47 CONN. L. REV. at 439; see also, Sara Jeruss, Robin Feldman, & Joshua
Walker, The America Invents Act 500: Effects of Patent Monetization Entities on US
Litigation, 11 DUKE LAW & TECH. REV. 357, 358 (2012) (“Any discussion of flaws in the
United States patent system inevitably turns to the system’s modern villain: nonpracticing entities.”); Lee, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. at 103 (“In the extreme, such
prejudice leads to a moral panic in which rational policymaking and decisionmaking give way to hysteria to fight the proverbial ‘folk devil’ (substitute: patent troll).”)
(citing STANLEY COHEN, FOLK DEVILS AND MORAL PANICS (1972)).
2

3

See http://lotnet.com/how-lot-works (accessed Dec. 2016).

4

Cf. JOHN LINDLOW, TROLLS: AN UNNATURAL HISTORY 131 (Reaktion Books, 2014)
(“Probably the most famous troll is the one under the bridge in The Three Billy Goats
Gruff.”). In the Norwegian fable, three billy goats cross a bridge in search of food.
Under the bridge lives a troll who threatens to eat each billy goat. The first two billy
goats each in turn convince the troll to save its appetite for the next, larger, billy goat
1
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2883829
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idea of the LOT is that a group of companies makes a pact that none of them will
transfer any of their patents to a troll. If any company breaks the pact, a license is
automatically granted to all of the other companies in the group, which takes effect
immediately upon transfer of the patent to the troll. The LOT’s plan to “eliminate
the patent troll threat,”5 is thus premised on the notion that licenses run with
patents when transferred. The LOT cannot be bothered to engage with the question
of how or to what extent this happens.6 But the question remains: is the LOT license
a creature of contract or of property?
On the one hand, it cannot be that the mere transfer of a patent wipes the
patent clean of all outstanding licenses. But at the same time, the LOT agreement is
a complex ten page contract with various provisions relating to bankruptcy, third
party beneficiaries, costs, governing law, and other issues.7 It cannot be that a
patent troll becomes a full party to that contract merely by virtue of acquiring a
single patent from a LOT member. So what “runs with the patent” must be
something including the bare license but something less than the entire contract or
license agreement creating the license.
Even if the parties to a license agreement attempt to address this issue in the
contract, that would not necessarily settle the matter. The parties can agree to make
following behind. But the third billy goat is so large that it defeats the troll, thus
permanently solving the troll problem, as the LOT purports to do. See id. at 69-70.
5

http://lotnet.com (accessed Dec. 2016).

6

See Part II(E), infra.

7

See LOT agreement, v2_0-11_24_15, at § 2.3, 5.3, 5.5, 5.6, 5.11, available at
http://lotnet.com/download-lot-agreement (accessed Dec. 2016).

2
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a license assignable.8 But the question here is different. The question here is when
the licensor transfers a licensed patent, to what extent is the acquirer of the patent
automatically bound by the obligations in the license agreement – to which the
patent acquirer never agreed.9 In other words, to what extent does a license
agreement change the underlying property rights, and conversely, to what extent
does it remain an in personam agreement between two contracting parties.10
How then to separate aspects of the license agreement which remain
between the parties to that agreement, from those which “run with the patent?” The
caselaw sometimes states that aspects of the license agreement that relate to the
“actual use” of the patented invention are “encumbrances” running with the patent.
However, this theory is not consistently applied and is not particularly coherent.
For example, courts have held that royalty rights do not run with the patent, though

8

See PPG Indus. v. Guardian Indus. Corp., 597 F.2d 1090, 1093 (6th Cir. 1979) (“It has
long been held by federal courts that agreements granting patent licenses are personal and
not assignable unless expressly made so.”); Troy Iron & Nail v. Corning, 55 U.S. (14
How.) 193, 14 L. Ed. 383 (1852) (“A mere license to a party, without having his assigns
or equivalents words to them, showing that it was meant to be assignable, is only the
grant of personal power to the licensees, and is not transferable by him to another.”).

9

Cf. Reuben v. U.S. Air, No. 11-1235, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84038, *19 (W.D. Pa.
June 18, 2012) (“It is fundamental contract law that one cannot be liable for a breach of
contract unless one is a party to that contract.”); Electron Energy Corp. v. Short, 408 Pa.
Super. 563, 571 (1991) (“It is fundamental contract law that one cannot be liable for a
breach of contract unless one is a party to the contract.”); Smartran, Inc. v. Alpine
Connections, Inc., 352 Fed. Appx. 650, 656 (3rd Cir. 2009).

10

See McCoy v. Mitsuboshi Cutlery, Inc., 67 F.3d 917, 920 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“Whether
express or implied, a license is a contract ‘governed by ordinary principles of state
contract law.’”) (quoting Power Lift, Inc. v. Weatherford Nipple-Up Sys., 871 F.2d 1082,
1085 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Christopher M. Newman, A License is not a “Contract not to
Sue”: Disentangling Property and Contract in the law of Copyright Licenses, 98 IOWA L.
REV. 1101, 1103 (2013) (distinguishing between “license” and “license agreement”).

3
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it is not clear how royalty rights received in exchange for allowing use of a patented
invention do not relate to “actual use” of that patented invention. The encumbrance
theory is also inconsistent with the principle that there can be no covenants running
with personal property, given that patents are by statute to be treated as having the
attributes of personal property.11
This article attempts to develop a better framework for analysis of these
issues, with the help of Hohfeld’s framework of jural relations and the “bundle of
sticks” conception of property. Under this theory, a patentee may give up one stick
in the bundle, the right to exclude the licensee, through the license agreement. In
Hohfeld’s terminology, the license agreement effects a change in the relation
between the patentee and the licensee, from “Right / Duty,” to “No-Right /
Privilege.”12 When the patentee transfers the patent, it transfers only what is left in
the bundle of patent rights, though the license agreement or contract remains
between the original two parties. This comports with the principle that one cannot
transfer what one no longer owns, or, nemo dat quod non habet.13
Under the bundle theory of this article, the bundle of patent rights granted by
the USPTO can be diminished but not enlarged by the actions of a patent owner. For

11

See Part I(A), infra; 35 U.S.C. § 261 (“patents shall have the attributes of personal
property”).
12

See Part I(C), infra.

13

See, e.g., Commerce Bank, N.A. v. Chrysler Realty Corp., 244 F.3d 777, 783 (10th Cir.
2001) (“[The holding that] an assignee can acquire rights no greater than those held by
the assignor is consistent with the basic principle of commercial law encapsulated in the
Latin phrase nemo dat qui non habet. . . . The basic concept behind nemo dat is that a
transferee’s rights are no better than those held by his transferor.).

4
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example, though royalty rights might be received by a licensor in exchange for
giving up one stick in the patent bundle, such rights would not be considered part of
the bundle of patent rights, and so would not automatically transfer with the patent.
A patent does not initially include a right to receive royalties, and a license
agreement cannot operate add that right to the in rem patent bundle.
Part I illustrates the problem, discusses the divide between property and
contract, and reviews Hohfeld and the “bundle of sticks” conception of property.
Part II compares the bundle theory with the law of covenants and encumbrances
that “run with” property interests, and evaluates aspects of license agreements
under these two theories, concluding that the bundle theory provides a more
coherent explanation. Part III explores some broader implications of the bundle
theory for other doctrines of patent law, such as patent exhaustion, FRAND
commitments, prior user rights, and laches.

Part I – Bundle Theory and Hohfeld
A.

Illustration Of The Problem

Consider companies A and B, which own ten patents each, and enter into a
cross-license agreement. Under the agreement, A has a license to all ten of B’s
patents, and B has a license to all ten of A’s patents. Then, A transfers one of its ten
patents (patent X) to company C. Does company C have a right to sue company B for
infringement of patent X? It seems clear that in general the answer is no. B paid for
a license to patent X when A owned that patent. B should not, absent contrary

5
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agreement, be deprived of the license bargained for, merely because A later decided
to transfer the licensed patent.14
Courts to have considered the question have generally reached this result.15
The courts have ruled that even a “bona fide purchaser” of a patent takes the patent
subject to “licenses, of which he must inform himself as best he can at his own
risk.”16 The intuition is that the purchaser of a patent should recognize the
possibility that licenses on the patent might exist, and should take steps to
investigate whether they in fact do exist.17

14

Cf. Lawrence Berger, Policy Analysis of Promises Respecting the Use of Land, 55
MINN. L. REV. 167, 169 (1970) (“It was early apparent that unless agreements (contained
in deeds or leases) respecting the use of land were binding not only upon the promisor
(covenantor) who entered into them but also upon purchasers from him, such
undertakings would be worthless, since otherwise they could be avoided by a mere
transfer to a third party.”); Jay Kesan & Carol M. Hayes, FRAND’s Forever: Standards,
Patent Transfers, and Licensing Commitments, 89 IND. L. J. 231, 304 (2014) (“if a
patentee could extinguish the benefits of a FRAND commitment by transferring the
patent to a third party, this would lead to inequitable results”).
15

See, e.g., Innovus Prime, LLC v. Panasonic Corp., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93820, *15
(N.D. Cal. July 2, 2013).
16

Jones v. Berger, 58 F. 1006, 1007 (C.C.D. Md. 1893); see also, Innovus Prime, 2013
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93820, *16 (“This occurs whether or not an assignee had notice.”); VFormation, Inc. v. Benetton Group SpA, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13352 (D. Colo. Mar.
10, 2006) (“The court does not agree that the doctrine of ‘bona fide purchaser’ as urged
by V-Formation precludes Benetton from asserting the covenant not to sue as a defense in
this case.”). Of course, a true “bona fide purchaser” patent assignee may have some
claim against a patent assignor / seller who is less than forthright about the extent to
which the patent has been license.
17

See Menachem Mautner, The Eternal Triangles of The Law, 90 MICH. L. REV. 95, 116
(1991) (“Clearly, whenever the purchaser acts with actual knowledge or presumed
suspicion of the existence of a prior conflicting claim, the purchaser is the party best
located to prevent the conflict by avoiding the transaction.”). In the case of licenses, the
purchaser would not necessarily avoid the transaction, but might just pay a lower price
for the patent, reflecting the inability to enforce against the licensed parties.

6
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But the more difficult question, on which the courts have been unclear, is:
under what theory does company B maintain its license to patent X. In this regard,
the case law presents at least two different possibilities.
The first possibility is that the license is an “encumbrance” that attaches to
the patent and “runs with” the patent when it is transferred.18 This theory seems to
derive from the common law on covenants that “run with the land,”19 but its
application to patent law can be problematic. What exactly runs with the patent? It
cannot be the entire license agreement. Considering the hypothetical agreement
above, it seems unlikely that given the mere transfer of patent X from A to C, C now
inherits A’s license rights to all ten of B’s patents. The contract between A and B
remains a contract between A and B, despite the transfer of one patent that was
licensed in that contract. So the encumbrance that runs with the patent is
something that derives from the license agreement, but something less than the
entirety of that agreement. This “encumbrance” theory is also in some tension with
the principle that covenants cannot run with personal property, given that by
statute, “patents shall have the attributes of personal property.”20

18

See, e.g., Innovus Prime, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93820, *15 (“agreements involving
the actual use of the patent ‘run with the patent’ and are binding on subsequent owners”)
(citing Datatreasury Corp. v. Wells Fargo & Co., 522 F.3d 1368, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).
19

See CHARLES E. CLARK, REAL COVENANTS AND OTHER INTERESTS WHICH “RUN WITH
THE LAND” (2d ed. 1947); Berger, supra, 55 MINN. L. REV. at 207.
20

35 U.S.C. § 261; see also, Jones v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 938 S.W.2d 118, 123 (Tex.
App. 14th 1996) (“Since a patent is to be treated as personal property, there can be no
covenants that ‘run with’ the patent.”); In re Particle Drilling Techs., 2009 Bankr. LEXIS
2151, *7 (S.D. Tex. 2009) (“Patents are personal property. Real property concepts (such
as covenants running with the land) do not apply to personal property.”).
7

Andrew C. Michaels

Patent Transfer

DRAFT – Dec. 2016

The second possibility is based on the general principle that one cannot
transfer what one does not own.21 Where a patentee, via a license agreement, has
already given up the right to exclude a particular licensee, the patentee cannot then
transfer that right. Using the “bundle of sticks” analogy,22 where a patentee has
already given up one stick in the bundle, the patentee transfers only what remains.
Returning to the hypothetical, A had already given up the right to exclude B from
practicing patent X, so A could not transfer that right to C. A transferred to C a
diminished bundle of sticks, that is, only those sticks that remained in the bundle.
Sometimes aspects of these two different theories are presented within a
single case, or even a single sentence.23 But these two possibilities (the
“encumbrance” theory and the “bundle” theory) have significant differences. To
begin with, they are aesthetic opposites; under the encumbrance theory, something

21

See, e.g., Sanofi, S.A. v. Med-Tech Veterinarian Prods., 565 F. Supp. 931, 939 (D.N.J.
1983) (explaining that it is a “principle of patent law . . . that the purchaser does not
acquire any rights greater than those possessed by the owner of the patent”) (citing
Featherstone v. Ormonde Cycle Co., 53 F. 110, 111 (C.C.N.Y. 1892)).
22

See, e.g., Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Impression Prods., 816 F.3d 721, 741 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(en banc) (“It has long been a familiar feature of our legal landscape that property rights
in a particular thing – like the separate interests in making, selling, using, etc., an
invention – are viewed as a ‘bundle’ of rights (or sticks) that can generally be transferred
separately.”); STEPHEN R. MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY 22-36 (1990); Thomas C.
Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in PROPERTY: NOMOS XXII 69 (J. Roland Pennock
& John W. Chapman eds., 1980).
23

See, e.g., Datatreasury Corp. v. Wells Fargo & Co., 522 F.3d 1368, 1372 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (“[B]ecause the owner of a patent cannot transfer an interest greater than that
which it possesses, an assignee takes a patent subject to the legal encumbrances
thereon.”); Innovus Prime, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93820, *15; Paice LLC v. Hyundai
Motor Co., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95042, *28 (D. Md. July 7, 2014) (“a patent owner
cannot transfer an interest greater than that which it possesses, and assignees take patent
rights subject to the legal encumbrances thereon”); see also Part II(A), infra.

8
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(an encumbrance) is added to the patent, whereas under the bundle theory,
something (a stick or a right) is subtracted.
These different cognitive frameworks can also lead to different practical
results. If the license agreement is a contract, and if the contract (or part of it) is an
encumbrance that travels with the patent, then a new patent owner who fails to
abide by the contract terms could potentially be subject to a claim for breach of
contract.24 By contrast, under the bundle theory, although a prior licensee would
have a license defense to an infringement claim by the new patent owner, the prior
licensee would not have a breach of contract claim, as the contract remains between
the original two parties.25
The bounds of the rights of the new patent owner are also potentially
different under the two theories. Courts applying the encumbrance theory have
generally stated or implied that that the encumbrance includes aspects of the license
agreement that relate to the actual use of the patent, or the patented invention.26

24

See, e.g., Kesan & Hayes, 89 IND. L. J. at 286 (“When a patent owner grants a license
to another party, the license is often analyzed as a contract.”); ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg,
86 F.3d 1447, 1450 (7th Cir. 1996) (“[W]e treat the licenses as ordinary contracts . . . .”);
H. Justin Pace, Note, Anti-Assignment Provisions, Copyright Licenses, and Intra-Group
Mergers: The Effect of Cincom v. Novelis, 9 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 263, 267
(2010) (“Copyright and patent licenses are contracts and as such are interpreted according
to state law.”); Mark R. Patterson, Must Licenses Be Contracts? Consent and Notice in
Intellectual Property, 40 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 105, 109 (2012) (“This Article argues that
the weight of judicial authority and sound policy support a contractual approach to
license formation.”).
25

See, e.g., Ericsson Inc. v. Wi-LAN USA, Inc., No. 14-21854-CV-DMM, D.I. 165, *10
(S.D. Fla., Aug. 14, 2015) (“Ericsson does not have standing to maintain its claim for
breach of contract.”).
26

See, e.g., Innovus Prime, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93820, *15 (“agreements involving
the actual use of the patent ‘run with the patent’ and are binding on subsequent owners”)
9
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Royalty rights to a percentage of licensee sales on a patented invention would
certainly relate to the use of the patented invention, and possibly use of the patent
as well. The encumbrance theory would thus seem to counsel that such royalty
rights should run with the patent, just as rent from a tenant would run with the land
to a new landlord.27 But where, as in the hypothetical, only a fraction of the licensed
patents are transferred, it could be difficult to apportion the extent to which royalty
benefits shift to the new owner.
Under the bundle theory, royalty rights would not travel with a patent,
absent contrary agreement. This is because the bundle of patent rights granted by
the USPTO did not include the right to receive royalties. The royalty rights were
extracted by the original patent owner in exchange for giving up the right to exclude
the licensee, but that does not make the royalty rights part of the patent bundle.28
Under the bundle theory, an in personam contract entered into by a patent owner
cannot add to the in rem bundle of patent rights transferred to a subsequent patent
owner. Avoiding the apportionment issue, as well as the issue of what does or does
not relate to the “actual use” of the patent or invention, the bundle theory gives a
more coherent answer as to whether certain aspects of a license agreement would
travel with the patent to a new owner.
(citing Datatreasury, 522 F.3d 1372); Paice, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95042, *32-33
(“licensing terms not tied to the right to use a patented invention do not encumber”).
27

See Berger, 55 MINN. L. REV. at 222 (“the burden of a covenant to pay rent runs with
the land to the assignee of the tenant and the benefit runs to the successor in ownership of
the landlord’s reversion”).
28

Cf. In re Particle Drilling Techs., 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 2151, *8 (“a royalty interest in a
patent cannot be considered a covenant that runs with the land”).

10
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Sharpening The Property / Contract Divide In Licenses

The relative clarity of the bundle theory is advantageous as compared with
the legal uncertainty of the encumbrance theory.29 In a patent transfer situation, the
parties (transferor and transferee) are already dealing and negotiating the transfer
of the patent.30 As such, it matters not so much where the entitlement is placed, but
it is important to be clear about where the entitlement lies.31 If the entitlements are
clear, the parties will more easily be able to be take them into account in negotiating
the price of the patent transfer, or contract around the default rule and transfer
additional aspects of any license agreements.32 As explained in Law and Economics
by Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen:
[B]argainers are more likely to cooperate when their rights are clear
and less likely to agree when their rights are ambiguous. . . . One

29

Cf. Berger, 55 MINN. L. REV. at 234 (“The rules of law about covenants running with
the land are so complex that only a very few specialists understand them. Sometimes
complexity in the law is necessary. In this particular case, it is not.”).
30

Where royalties are concerned, the relevant analysis is between the patent transferor
and transferee, assuming that the licensee will be paying the same amount either way.
The question is just, as a default rule, who will the licensee be paying. If the royalties do
not run, the transferor continues to get paid. If the royalties do run, the payments go to
the patent transferee (the new owner) instead.
31

Cf. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. ECON. 1, 8 (1960) (“the ultimate
result (which maximizes the value of production) is independent of the legal position if
the pricing system is assumed to work without cost”); Guido Calabresi & Douglas
Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral,
85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1094 (1972) (“Recently it has been argued that on certain
assumptions, usually termed the absence of transaction costs, Pareto optimality or
economic efficiency will occur regardless of the initial entitlement.”).
32

Kesan & Hayes, 89 IND. L. J. at 289 (“markets require contracting or exchange, and
uncertainty threatens exchange”); JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 68 (1992).

11

Andrew C. Michaels

Patent Transfer

DRAFT – Dec. 2016

implication of this finding is that property law ought to favor criteria
for determining ownership that are clear and simple.33
Uncertainty in where the entitlements lie can only serve to complicate
matters, creating costs related to confusion in negotiation, and potentially even
future disputes leading to litigation. Clear and simple rights regarding in rem rules
such as patents rights can help to minimize information costs.34 This supports the
idea that under the bundle theory of this article, the patentee can diminish the in
rem patent bundle of patent rights by entering into a license agreement, but cannot
add to that bundle of rights. Allowing a patentee to add to the in rem bundle of
property rights granted by the USPTO would impose significant information costs
on society, as such in rem rights are “against the world” and thus impose correlative
duties on everyone else, as will be explained further in the next subsection.
This is not entirely just a matter of default rules. The parties to a license
agreement could probably successfully agree that a license will not run with the
licensed patent, as this would not adversely affect a non-party to the agreement
such as a bona fide purchaser of the patent. But an agreement that all aspects of a
license agreement will necessarily bind a future patent owner could be problematic.
How would such an agreement bind a purchaser of the patent who did not sign the

33

ROBERT COOTER AND THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 89 (3d. ed. 2000).

34

Thomas Merrill & Henry Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 COLUM. L. REV.
773, 795 (2001) (“The disadvantages of the exclusion strategy are largely a function of
the limitations on such rights imposed by the need to minimize the unit costs of
processing information. In order to keep these costs low, it is simply not possible to
make these duties very complex or detailed.”).

12
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contract and may not have even known its terms, some of which may have been
confidential? The contract as such could not bind the patent purchaser.
But at the same time, the licensee is not a party to the patent sale transaction,
and it is important not to allow that transaction to too severely upset the rights of
the licensee, who would expect to maintain the bargained for use privileges. The
transfer of the patent cannot erase the effects of the in personam license agreement
on the underlying in rem patent rights. As explained by Thomas Merrill and Henry
Smith in their article on “The Property/Contract Interface”:
[W]here we find legal relations that are purely in rem, we also
consistently find that the doctrine adopts the form characteristic of
property law – immutable bright-line rules. . . . [W]e find a tendency
for protective and even notice rules to become more difficult to
contract around – more standardized – as duty holders become more
numerous and indefinite and so closer to the true in rem situation.35
Thus to use the terminology of Merrill and Smith, license agreements can be
thought of as lying along the interface of property and contract.36 In furtherance of
clarity regarding the separation of property and contract in license agreements,
unpacking the legal rights and duties at play in a patent transfer situation using
Hohfeld’s framework jural relations,37 can be helpful.38

35

Id. at 850.

36

See id. at 849 (“Each of the four institutions we have examined involves some
combination of in personam and in rem relations.”).
37

Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in
Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L. J. 16 (1913).
38

Pierre Schlag, How To Do Things With Hohfeld, 78 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 185, 187
(2015) (“One of the most striking aspects of Hohfeld’s work is how much its architecture
and arguments remain relevant – even bitingly so – today.”). See generally, Symposium
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Hohfeld’s Jural Relations

The bundle of rights picture of property has strong roots in Hohfeld’s work
on fundamental jural relations.39 The lack of precision in court decisions as to what
runs with the patent stems in part from failure to distinguish between “license” as
pure change in jural relation, and the “license agreement” which, inter alia, effects
that change.40 Indeed this is precisely the type of looseness of language that
motivated Hohfeld’s articulation of the jural relations, and for which they can serve
as useful tools for analysis.41 In short, a patent is often said to provide a “right to

on the Work of Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, https://www.law.yale.edu/yls-today/yalelaw-school-events/symposium-work-wesley-newcomb-hohfeld (Oct. 15, 2016).
39

See J.E. Penner, The “Bundle of Rights” Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711,
729 (1996) (“Hohfeld’s contribution to the bundle of rights picture is quite
understandable, since in a significant sense, he devised it, although he did not fully
elaborate its contours.”); Merrill & Smith, 101 COLUM. L. REV. at 783 (explaining that
Hohfeld’s work “directly anticipates the adoption of the bundle-of-rights metaphor
favored by the Legal Realists”).
40

Wesley N. Hohfeld, Faulty Analysis in Easement and License Cases, 27 YALE L. J. 66,
92 n.49 (1917) (explaining that the “chameleon-hued term, ‘license,’” “is rapidly shifted
about by lawyers and courts, -- usually even by the more careful writers, -- so as to cover
not only more complex groups of operative facts, but also the jurial relations flowing
either from a ‘mere permission’ or from more complex sets of facts”); see also Hohfeld,
23 YALE L. J. at 24-25 (“Passing to the field of contracts, we soon discover a similar
inveterate tendency to confuse and blur legal discussions by failing to discriminate
between the mental and physical facts involved in the so-called ‘agreements’ of the
parties, and the legal ‘contractual obligation’ to which those facts give rise.”).
41

Hohfeld, 23 YALE L. J. at 22 (“At the very outset it seems necessary to emphasize the
importance of differentiating purely legal relations from the physical and mental facts
that call such relations into being.”); see also, Schlag, 78 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. at
192 (“Consider the term ‘contract.’ Sometimes it refers to the mental agreement reached
by the parties (e.g., the mental state); at other times to the physical embodiment of that
agreement, (e.g., the document); and, at other times, to the various rights, duties, and
powers brought into being in virtue of reaching the agreement (e.g., the legal
relations).”).
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exclude,”42 and as such, using Hohfeld’s framework, correspondingly provides by
definition that others have a “duty” not to infringe.43 So if each right held by the
patentee is a stick in the bundle, the license agreement diminishes the size of the
patent bundle.
The first thing to grasp about Hohfeld’s jural relations is that are merely a
framework for analysis; the jural relations are sui generis creations, and Hohfeld
explicitly declined to provide formal definitions.44 The jural relations are a device
for fostering precision in legal analysis. They do not themselves purport to make
normative prescriptions about what the law should be.45
The motivation for this framework is as Hohfeld puts it, “the ambiguity and
looseness of our legal terminology.”46 Hohfeld offers the term “property” as a
“striking example,” as sometimes it is used to refer to the physical object that is the

42

See, e.g., 5 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 16.02[1] (2008) (“a patent
grants to the patentee and his assigns the right to exclude others from making, using, and
selling the invention”); Bio-Tech. Gen. Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 80 F.3d 1553, 1559
(Fed. Cir. 1996) (“a patent grants only the right to exclude others and confers no right on
its holder to make, use, or sell”); Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property:
Delineating Entitlements in Information, 116 YALE L. J. 1742, 1806 (2007) (“Although it
is sometimes overlooked, patent law is explicitly based on exclusion rather than on rights
to use . . . .”).
43

See Hohfeld, 23 YALE L. J. at 33 (“the correlative of X’s right that Y shall not enter on
the land is Y’s duty not to enter”).
44

Hohfeld, 23 YALE L. J. at 30 (“The strictly fundamental legal relations are, after all, sui
generis; and thus attempts at formal definition are always unsatisfactory, if not altogether
useless.”).
45

See Schlag, 78 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. at 189 (“Hohfeld’s work might best be read
as a contribution about how to think, not what to think.”).
46

Hohfeld, 23 YALE L. J. at 21.
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property, but sometimes it is “used to denote the legal interest (or aggregate of legal
relations) appertaining to such physical object.”47 As Hohfeld explains, confusion
can arise because “[f]requently there is a rapid and fallacious shift from the
onemeaning to the other,” and at times, the term “is used in such a ‘blended’ sense
as to convey no definite meaning whatever.”48
The term “license” is a perfect example of the type of ambiguous language
that could benefit from Hohfeldian analysis.49 “License” might refer to the license
agreement, the contract, between the licensor and the licensee. Or it might refer to
the legal relations that arise from the license agreement, such as the privilege to
infringe a particular patent.50 The distinction matters because while transfer of a
patent is generally held not to affect the licensee’s privilege to infringe, that does not
mean that the entire license agreement runs with the patent.
Hohfeld was concerned with a similar issue regarding term “contract,” in that
“[o]ne moment the word may mean the agreement of the parties; and then, with a
rapid and unexpected shift, the writer or speaker may use the term to indicate the

47

Id.

48

Id. at 21-22.

49

See Charles E. Clark, Licenses in Real Property Law, 21 COLUM. L. REV. 757, 757
(1921) (“Here courts tend inveterately to confuse acts and the legal relations which result
therefrom and the battle begun over words terminates in a result shaped by those
words.”).
50

Indeed Hohfeld stated that the “chameleon-hued term, ‘license,’” is “rapidly shifted
about by lawyers and courts,” and but did not go much further in this regard because
“dealing at all adequately with the intricate and confused subject, would, in and of itself,
require a long article.” Wesley N. Hohfeld, Faulty Analysis in Easement and License
Cases, 27 YALE L. J. 66, 92 n.49 (1917).
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contractual obligation created by law as a result of the agreement.”51 Charles Clark
also recognized this problem and argued for distinguishing between the “license” as
such, and the acts of agreement which create the license.52 Similarly, Christopher M.
Newman explains that to “discuss clearly the relationship between license and
contract, we must also distinguish between acts that signify assent to binding
agreements, documents in which those agreements are memorialized, and various
legal consequences that follow from them.”53
Hohfeld developed the jural relations as a terminology for the purely legal
quantities, so as to avoid confusing them with the physical or mental facts with give
rise to those legal relations. It is helpful to break the jural relations into two sets,
here is the first set in terms of “correlatives”:
Right <--> Duty
No Right <--> Privilege
And here is the first set again but in terms of “opposites”:
Right X No Right
Privilege X Duty54
Rights and Duties are “correlatives,” in that if A has a Right against B, then B
owes a corresponding Duty to A.55 This is not any type of a normative or
51

Hohfeld, 23 YALE L. J. at 25; see also, Schlag, 78 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. at 192.

52

Clark, Licenses in Real Property Law, 21 COLUM. L. REV. 757, 760-61 (“The use of
the one term ‘license’ to describe a privilege accompanied by an immunity from
revocation and a privilege not so accompanied creates an illusion of certainty and an
erroneous belief in identity.”).
53

Newman, 98 IOWA L. REV. at 1129.

54

Hohfeld, 23 YALE L. J. at 30.
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prescriptive statement, this is just how Hohfeld’s analytical method works, by
definition. So if A has a Right that B stay off of Whiteacre, then B has a Duty to stay
of Whiteacre, because that is precisely what it means to say that A has such a Right,
under Hohfeld’s framework.56 But if B has a Privilege to enter Whiteacre, then A has
a No Right that B Stay off Whiteacre, as No Rights are the correlatives of Privileges
just as Rights are the correlatives of Duties.57 The correlatives are represented by
two way arrows above because where one is present (on one side of a relation) the
other is present (on the other side).
“Rights” and “No Rights” are “opposites” in that one cannot have both a Right
and a No Right to the same thing. The No Right is the negation of a Right. Similarly,
Privileges and Duties are opposites. As Hohfeld explains, the “privilege of entering
is the negation of a duty to stay off.”58 One cannot have both a Privilege to enter and
a Duty to stay off. As such, the opposites are represented by X’s above because
where one is present on one side of a relation the other is absent on the same side.
The primary difference between calling something a Right and calling it a
Privilege, is that a Right forms the predicate basis for an affirmative legal claim,

55

Hohfeld, 23 YALE L. J. at 32 (“if X has a right against Y that he shall stay off the
former’s land, the correlative (and equivalent) is that Y is under a duty toward X to stay
off the place”).
56

Schlag, 78 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. at 201 (“It is not so much that rights ‘imply’ or ‘give
rise’ to duties. Rather, one’s rights are duties in someone else just as one’s duties are
rights in someone else. As Karl Llewellyn observed, rights and duties are simply
different ways of talking about the same legal relation.”).
57

Hohfeld, 23 YALE L. J. at 33 (“the correlative of X’s privilege of entering himself is
manifestly Y’s ‘no-right’ that X shall not enter”).
58

Hohfeld, 23 YALE L. J. at 32.
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whereas a Privilege is a defense to a legal claim, or the freedom from such a claim.
As explained by Hohfeld: “A right is one’s affirmative claim against another, and a
privilege is one’s freedom from the right or claim of another."59 Once this is
understood, the seemingly odd terminology of a “No Right” begins to make sense. A
violation of a Duty opens one up to a legal claim under the correlative Right. By
contrast, the exercise of a Privilege does not subject one to a legal claim, as the
correlative is a “No Right.” But a Privilege does not imply an affirmative claim
against one who interferes with the exercise of the Privilege.60
The second set of jural relations functions similarly to the first set, here is the
second set in terms of correlatives:
Power <--> Liability
Disability <--> Immunity
Here is the second set again but in terms of opposites:
Power X Disability
Immunity X Liability61
A Power is similar to a Right, a Liability is similar to a Duty, a Disability (or
“No Power”) is similar to a No Right, and an Immunity is similar to a Privilege.62 The

59

Hohfeld, 23 YALE L. J. at 55.

60

Schlag, 78 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. at 201 (“This gets us to the crux of the matter with
regard to the difference between rights and privileges. The former establishes the
predicate for a legal remedy, namely a duty in B.”).
61

Hohfeld, 23 YALE L. J. at 30.

62

Hohfeld, 23 YALE L. J. at 55 (“a power bears the same general contrast to an immunity
that a right does to a privilege”).
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difference is that, unlike a Right which represents the potential for an affirmative
claim against another, a “power is one’s affirmative ‘control’ over a given legal
relation as against another.”63 For example, if A makes a contractual offer to B, B
now has the Power to accept that offer, and A is Liable in the sense that A would be
bound if B chooses to accept.64 Upon expiration of the offer, B’s Power becomes a
Disability, and A’s Liability becomes an Immunity.
The first set of jural relations tracks the patent license situation rather well.
A patent holder has the Right to exclude others from practicing the claimed
invention; as such, others have a Duty to refrain from infringing the patent. When a
patent holder grants a license, the licensee can be said to have been granted a
Privilege to infringe the patent.65 The patent owner licensor now has a “No Right” in
that she has given up the Right to exclude the licensee. She has given up that stick in
the bundle of sticks that is the patent. The licensee is thereby freed from his Duty to
refrain from infringing.66 As the Federal Circuit has explained:
Even if couched in terms of “licensee is given the right to make, use, or
sell X,” the [license] agreement cannot convey that absolute right

63

Id. at 55.

64

Id. at 49.

65

Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Genetics Inst., Inc., 52 F.3d 1026, 1031 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“In its
simplest form, a license means only leave to do a thing which the licensor would
otherwise have a right to prevent. Such a license grants to the licensee merely a privilege
that protects him from a claim of infringement by the owner of the patent monopoly.”)
(quoting Western Elec. Co. v. Pacent Reproducer Corp., 42 F.2d 116, 118 (2d. Cir.
1930)) (emphasis added).
66

See Kesan & Hayes, 89 IND. L. J. at 289 (“If a patent licensee has a privilege to use the
licensed patent, this indicates that the licensee has no duty to refrain from using the
patent.”).
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because not even the patentee of X is given that right. His right is
merely one to exclude others from making, using or selling X. . . .67
As such, the license agreement, in the form of a contract, can be said to effect
the following purely legal change: the relationship between the licensor and the
licensee, with respect to the patent, flips from one of Right / Duty, to one of No Right
/ Privilege. Under the bundle theory, when a patent is transferred, while the license
agreement (the contract) will remain between the original two parties, this change
in legal relation will travel with the patent, remaining between the patentee and the
licensee. The distinction between that which travels with the patent and that which
does not thus tracks Hohfeld’s distinction between the “purely legal relations” and
the “physical and mental facts that call such relations into being.”68 If the patent is a
bundle of Rights to exclude, and the patentee has already given up one of the Rights
in the bundle, the patentee may transfer only what is left, under nemo dat. In place
of the Right to exclude the licensee, the transferred bundle contains a No Right to
exclude, and the licensee thus maintains its Privilege to infringe the patent.

D.

In Rem (Multital) Versus In Personam (Paucital)

Another important point to understand is that in Hohfeld’s scheme, all rights
are between human beings, rather than things. As Hohfeld explains, “since the
purpose of the law is to regulate the conduct of human beings, all jural relations

67

Spindelfabrik Suessen-Schurr Stahlecker & Grill GmbH v. Schubert & Salzer
Maschinenfabrik Aktiengesellschaft, 829 F.2d 1075, 1081 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (citing 35
U.S.C. § 154).
68

Hohfeld, 23 YALE L. J. at 20.
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must, in order to be clear and direct in their meaning, be predicated of such human
beings.”69 Similarly, at the dawn of the 20th Century, Oliver Wendell Holmes stated:
“All proceedings, like all rights, are really against persons. Whether they are
proceedings or rights in rem depends on the number of persons affected.”70
The notion that all rights are between people, not things, is in tension with
the terminology of “in rem,” which literally means “against or about a thing.”71 This
bothered Hohfeld. Again in the name of precision and avoidance of confusion,
Hohfeld was insistent that a “right in rem is not a right ‘against a thing.’”72 Hohfeld
was of the view that “because of the unfortunate terminology involved, the
expression ‘right in rem’ is all too frequently misconceived, and meanings attributed
to it that could not fail to blur and befog legal thought and argument.”73 Thus
Hohfeld proposed the alternative terminology (which never really caught on) of
“multital” (instead of in rem) and “paucital” (instead of in personam).74

69

Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 26 YALE L. J. 710, 721 (1917). This second article is somewhat of a
continuation of or sequel to Hohfeld’s first (1913) article on the jural relations, which had
the same title.
70

Tyler v. Court of Registration, 175 Mass. 71, 76 (1900).

71

Merrill & Smith, 101 COLUM. L. REV. at 782 n.28.

72

Hohfeld, 26 YALE L. J. at 720. See also, id. at 733 (“the attempt to conceive of a right
in rem as a right against a thing should be abandoned as intrinsically unsound, as
thoroughly discredited according to good usage, and, finally, as all too likely to confuse
and mislead”).
73

Hohfeld, 26 YALE L. J. at 720.

74

Id. at 712.
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According to Hohfeld, the real difference between a right in rem and a right in
personam is not that the former is against a thing and the latter is against a person.
They are both against people. The difference is one of quantity; the in rem right is
held against many other people (it is multital), whereas the in personam right is held
against one person, or a few people (it is paucital). Or as Hohfeld put it, “a right in
personam is one having few, if any, ‘companions,’; whereas a right in rem always has
many such ‘companions.’”75 Although Hohfeld himself did not use the term “bundle
of rights,” once we conceive of an in rem right as a multitude of “companion” rights,
we are well on our way towards the bundle theory.76
There are a couple other general characteristics of in rem rights that are
worth mentioning. One is that in rem rights are generally negative in character in
that they require that persons abstain from doing something, (i.e., the duty not to
infringe a patent).77 This makes sense as it would be rather onerous if an in rem
right required its many subjects to all affirmatively do something. Another is that
the class of dutyholders subject to an in rem right is not only large, but also
indefinite with respect to identity.78 For example, a patent owner would not be able
to name every person subject to the duty to refrain from infringement.

75

Id. at 723.

76

See Hohfeld, 26 YALE L. J. at 743 (“the supposed single right in rem correlating with ‘a
duty’ on ‘all’ persons really involves as many separate and distinct ‘right-duty’ relations
as there are persons subject to a duty”).
77

Merrill & Smith, 101 COLUM. L. REV. at 788; A.M. Honore, Rights of Exclusion and
Immunities Against Divesting, 34 TUL. L. REV. 453, 458-59 (1960).
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As with his framework of jural relations, Hohfeld’s multital / paucital
framework maps well onto the patent license situation.79 A patent owner has a
multital bundle of rights to exclude against other persons. The license agreement is
a paucital contract that serves to negate or eliminate one of those rights, that with
respect to the licensee.80 The patent owner retains the bundle of rights, but there is
one less right in the bundle. When the patent owner transfers the bundle, she
transfers only what remains in it. The bundle (or patent) does not revert to its
original size upon transfer.81 But the license agreement, the in personam contract,
nevertheless remains between the patent transferor and the licensee.
Because a patent is not a tangible thing and does not provide a “right to
use,” it is particularly well suited to the bundle of rights conception. Perhaps the
strongest critique of the bundle of rights theory of property is that it fails to
sufficiently reflect the fact that ownership often provides the right to use and

78

Merrill & Smith, 101 COLUM. L. REV. at 783-84; Albert Kocourek, Rights in Rem, 68
U. PA. L. REV. 322, 335 (1920).
79

See Hohfeld, 26 YALE L. J. at 719 (“A’s right against B is a multital right, or right in
rem, for it is simply one of A’s class of similar, though separate, rights, actual and
potential, against very many persons. The same points apply as regards . . . A’s right that
B shall not manufacture a certain article as to which A has a so-called patent.”).
80

J.E. Penner, 43 UCLA L. REV. at 745 (“Licenses do not affect all holders of the general
duty to exclude themselves from the property of others; only those party to the license are
relieved of the duty.”).
81

Cf., Merrill & Smith, 101 COLUM. L. REV. at 787 (“[I]f A sells Blackacre to B, this
does not result in any change in the duties of third parties W, X, Y or Z toward
Blackacre. Those duties shift silently from A to B without any requirement that W, X, Y,
or Z be aware of the transfer, or even the identities of A or B.”).
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control a discrete physical thing.82 In the case of land for example, it is sometimes
much simpler to conceive of ownership as dominion over the tangible parcel of land,
rather than as an abstract bundle of legal relations against the world. But this
critique has little force as applied to patents. The counterpart of the right to use
land might be the patent right to a particular market position – a monopoly on the
patented invention – but the monopoly is intangible and is provided by virtue of the
bundle of rights to exclude others from infringing.83

Part II – Patent Licenses On Transfer
The bundle of rights is often discussed in the context of whether an exclusive
patent licensee has standing to sue. The Federal Circuit has explained that to “have
co-plaintiff standing in an infringement suit, a licensee must hold some of the
proprietary sticks from the bundle of patent rights.”84 These “proprietary rights
granted by the patent are the rights to exclude others from making, using or selling

82

See J.E. Penner, 43 UCLA L. REV. at 743 (“The right to property is a right of exclusion
which is grounded by the interest we have in the use of things.”); Merrill & Smith, 101
COLUM. L. REV. at 787 (“In personam rights attach directly to specific persons, whereas
in rem rights attach to persons only because of their relationship to a particular ‘thing.’”);
id. at 783 (“in rem rights . . . attach to persons through their relationship to particular
things”).
83

See J.E. Penner, 43 UCLA L. REV. at 745 (“one is inexorably led into a realm of
interminable abstract confusion if one regards the ownership of a patent as really the
ownership of an idea, rather than a monopoly on action whose scope is defined by an
extremely important expression of what actions are monopolized, i.e., the patent
specification and claims”).
84

Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Genetics Inst., Inc., 52 F.3d 1026, 1031 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
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the invention in the United States.”85 While a non-exclusive, or “bare” license would
not transfer any rights to exclude and thus would not transfer standing, an exclusive
licensee owns some of the proprietary sticks and may have standing.86 As explained
by the en banc Federal Circuit:
If the party has not received an express or implied promise of
exclusivity under the patent, i.e., the right to exclude others from
making, using, or selling the patented invention, the party has a “bare
license,” and has received only the patentee’s promise that the party
will not be sued for infringement.87
Thus a patent can be thought of as a bundle of rights to exclude, for it is the
right to exclude that is “at the very heart of patent law.”88 Accordingly, royalty
rights arising from a license agreement have been held not to confer standing, as
they are “merely a means of compensation under the agreement,” rather than a part
of the patent right itself.89 The Eastern District of Texas has stated: “A patentee’s

85

Id.

86

Id. at 1032 (“a licensee with proprietary rights in the patent is generally called an
‘exclusive’ licensee”). See also, Christopher M. Newman, An Exclusive License Is Not
an Assignment: Disentangling Divisibility and Transferability of Ownership in
Copyright, 74 LOUISIANA L. REV. 59, 79 (2013) (“A bare license, however, is nothing
more than a privilege.”).
87

Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc). See
also, Newman, 74 LOUISIANA L. REV. at 90 (explaining that an exclusive license, “is still
a form of license, however, because the licensor retains a residuum of control over the
use rights, consisting of the sole power to permit their transfer from one party to
another.”).
88

Penril Datacomm Networks, Inc. v. Rockwell Intern. Corp., 934 F. Supp. 708, 712 (D.
Md. 1996).
89

Chan v. Time Warner Entm’t Co., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16390, *19 (W.D. Tex. Jul.
23, 2003).
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right to royalty payments or infringement damages does not limit or detract from
the assignment of a patent or substantial rights thereunder.”90
Having conceptualized the patent as a bundle of rights to exclude, this article
now looks at the effect of patent transfer on various aspects of patent licenses.
A.

Arbitration Clauses

The coexistence of the encumbrance theory alongside elements of the bundle
theory is well demonstrated in the following paragraph from the Federal Circuit’s
decision in Datatreasury Corp. v. Wells Fargo & Co.:
Appellants rely on cases standing for the general proposition that
because the owner of a patent cannot transfer an interest greater than
that which it possesses, an assignee takes a patent subject to the legal
encumbrances thereon. . . . However, the legal encumbrances deemed
to “run with the patent” in these cases involved the right to use the
patented product, not a duty to arbitrate. The cases do not support a
conclusion that procedural terms of a licensing agreement unrelated
to the actual use of the patent (e.g. an arbitration clause) are binding
on a subsequent owner of the patent.91
The beginning of this paragraph is in some accord with the bundle theory in
invoking nemo dat, the principle that the owner of a patent cannot transfer an
interest greater than that which it possesses. However, the paragraph quickly
transitions to the encumbrance theory and the notion that only encumbrances
related to the “actual use of the patent” run with the patent.

90

Dexas Int’l, Ltd. v. Tung Yung Int’l (USA) Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34766, *28
(E.D. Tex. Feb. 25, 2009) (citing Vaupel Textilmaschinen KG v. Meccanica Euro Italia
S.P.A., 944 F.2d 870, 875 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
91

Datatreasury Corp. v. Wells Fargo & Co., 522 F.3d 1368, 1372-73 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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In Datatreasury, the agreement at issue was between Wells Fargo Services
Corp. (“WFSC”) and WMR e-Pin LLC (“WMR”). The agreement, inter alia, provided a
license to U.S. Patent No. 5,265,007 (“the 007 Patent”) as well as “all applications
and patent disclosures related thereto,” and also included an arbitration clause
which provided: “Any dispute or disagreement arising between WMR and Wells
Fargo concerning the applicability or interpretation of this License Agreement shall
be resolved in accordance with the dispute resolution procedures . . . .”92 After
entering into the agreement with WFSC, WMR assigned the 007 Patent to
Datatreasury, along with three other patents. Datatreasury then filed a complaint in
the Eastern District of Texas accusing Wells Fargo of infringing the three other
patents. There was a dispute as to whether the three patents in suit were “related”
to the 007 Patent within the meaning of the WFSC / WMR agreement.93 Wells Fargo
argued that this dispute should be submitted to arbitration in accordance with the
agreement. But the court held that Datatreasury was not bound by the arbitration
clause because it was not a signatory of the contract and did not participate in
“negotiating any of its terms,” and that the arbitration clause did not run with the
007 Patent as it was “unrelated to the actual use of the patent.”94
Although this result seems correct, the reasoning is suspect. One could
question whether the arbitration clause is really unrelated to the use of the patent.
If a patent is a right to exclude that is enforced through litigation, then one of the
92

Datatreasury, 522 F.3d at 1370-71.

93

See id. at 1372 n.2.

94

Id. at 1372-73.
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primary uses of a patent might be to bring a suit for infringement. A clause
specifying the forum in which such a suit would take place could be said to relate to
the use of the patent.
The bundle theory provides more clarity in explaining the result of
Datatreasury. The arbitration clause provides the Power to move an infringement
suit to arbitration. If both parties hold this Power, then both parties are subject to
the correlative Liability of having the case moved to arbitration. This Power arose
from the WFSC / WMR agreement, which was an in personam contract between
those two parties, and that contract remained between those two parties when the
007 Patent was transferred. The Power to move the case to arbitration was not
granted by the USPTO and was never part of the patent bundle, so the contract did
not operate to add that Power to the bundle. Nor was the correlative Liability added
to the patent bundle. The arbitration clause remains a feature of the license
agreement, the contract, and thus remains between the two contracting parties.
The theory that a license is an encumbrance that “runs with” a patent has
apparent roots in the law of covenants that run with land. Under the common law
deriving from Spencer’s Case,95 for a covenant to run with land, one requirement has
been that the covenant “touch or concern” the land.96 This is similar to the Federal
Circuit’s ruling that only encumbrances that are not “unrelated to the actual use of
95

5 Co. 16a, 77 Eng. Rep. 72 (Q. B. 1583).

96

See CHARLES E. CLARK, REAL COVENANTS AND OTHER INTERESTS WHICH “RUN WITH
THE LAND” 96 (2d ed. 1947); Berger, supra, 55 MINN. L. REV. at 207 (“Spencer’s Case
established that the burden of a covenant does not run to an assignee unless it ‘touches
and concerns’ the leased property and is not merely ‘collateral.’”).
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the patent” will “run with the patent.”97 It is also in some accord with the common
law’s refusal to allow easements “in gross” – unrelated to a particular parcel of land
– to run with the land.98
As demonstrated by the arbitration clause at issue in Datatreasury, one
problem with the encumbrance formulation is that it is rather indeterminate. This
has been true even with respect to the common law “touches and concerns” rule for
land.99 But the problem is even worse for patents, given that patent rights are
intangible so there is no physical thing or land to “touch.”100 What is exactly is “use
of the patent,” and how related is related enough? This indeterminacy is
exacerbated (or demonstrated) by the fact that in addition to “use of the patent,” the
rule has also been alternatively formulated in terms of “use of the patented
product,” and “use of the invention.”101

97

Datatreasury, 522 F.3d at 1372-73.

98

Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, The New Servitudes, 96 GEO. L. J. 885, 894 (2008)
(“The English courts . . . refused to enforce easements ‘in gross,’ which benefit a person
or entity without regard to land ownership.”); Newman, 74 LOUISIANA L. REV. at 86
(“One line of doctrine held that easements were permissible only if made appurtenant to
an adjacent tenement.”); Loch Sheldrake Assocs. v. Evans, 118 N.E.2d 444, 447 (N.Y.
1954) (“If we are to speak with strictest accuracy, there is no such thing as an ‘easement
in gross’ . . . since an easement presupposes two distinct tenements, one dominant, the
other servient.”).
99

CLARK, REAL COVENANTS, supra, at 96 (“It has been found impossible to state any
absolute tests to determine what covenants touch and concern land and what do not.”).
100

Cf. Peter S. Menell, The Property Rights Movement’s Embrace of Intellectual
Property: True Love or Doomed Relationship?, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 713, 739 (2007)
(“extrapolating from real property law to intellectual property law overlooks important
distinctions between the underlying resources at issue”).
101

Compare Paice, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95042, *32-33 (“licensing terms not tied to
the right to use a patented invention do not encumber”), with Datatreasury, 522 F.2d
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Royalty Rights

It is not necessary or practical for purposes of this article to go into too much
detail regarding the substantial intricacies of the common law on covenants running
with land. But one important point is that when a landowner leases land, and then
transfers the leased land, the benefit of rent is said to run with the land to the new
landowner.102 The patent law analogue of the rent a landowner receives is the
royalties that a patent owner might receive under a license agreement. Applying the
encumbrance theory, one would think that just as the rent paid by a tenant runs
with the land, royalty rights paid by the licensee should run with the patent, for it
would be hard to argue that such royalty rights do not relate to the use of the patent.
But in this regard, the caselaw has reached the opposite conclusion,
demonstrating another inadequacy of the encumbrance theory. In Jones v. Cooper,
the Texas Court of Appeals stated that “‘royalties,’ . . . would not ‘run with’ title to the
patents and be binding upon subsequent assignees,” invoking the principle that
“[s]ince a patent is [by statute] to be treated as personal property, there can be no
covenants that ‘run with’ the patent.”103 Similarly, in In re Particle Drilling Techs.,
the court found that a “royalty interest in a patent cannot be considered a covenant
1368, 1372-73 (“[T]he legal encumbrances deemed to ‘run with the patent’ in these cases
involved the right to use the patented product, not a duty to arbitrate. The cases do not
support a conclusion that procedural terms of a licensing agreement unrelated to the
actual use of the patent (e.g. an arbitration clause) are binding on subsequent owners of
the patent.”) (emphases added).
102

Berger, 55 MINN. L. REV. at 222.

103

See Jones v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 938 S.W.2d 118, 122-23 (Tex. App. 14th 1996); 35
U.S.C. § 261 (“patents shall have the attributes of personal property”); Pressure Sys. Int’l
v. Airgo IP, LLC, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90166, *15 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (“Agreements
about patent rights do not run with the patents; they are also personal”).
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that runs with the land,” again invoking the principle that patents are personal
property and “[r]eal property concepts (such as covenants running with the land)
do not apply to personal property.”104
The notion that royalty rights should not automatically run with a patent
seems reasonable, in part because often royalty rights will not correspond directly
to the use of a single patent in the way that rent corresponds to the use of single
tract of land. The license agreement may cover an entire portfolio of patents
relating to the same products or even different types of products. If only one or
some of these patents are transferred, it might be difficult to apportion how much of
the royalty rights should transfer. Of course, when transferring the patent, the
transferor and transferee could contract around the default rule and agree that
some royalties will pass to the transferee along with the patent. But keeping the
royalties with the transferor seems to provide the clearest and most coherent
default rule, thereby lowering transaction costs.105
Furthermore, some of the consideration for a license agreement may be in
the form of a cross-license to the licensee’s patents. Would the cross license also
run with the patent in the way an easement to use an adjoining tract of land runs
with a parcel of land? This would seem problematic. Returning to the hypothetical

104

In re Particle Drilling Techs., 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 2151, *7 (S.D. Tex. 2009).

105

See COOTER & ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS at 89; Part I(B), supra; see also, Jeremy
Kidd, Kindergarten Coase, 17 GREEN BAG 2D. 141, 155 (2014) (“[E]stablish rules that
are clear and predictable, so that the costs of bargaining post-intervention are lower.
Bargaining can be difficult enough without having to spend time and money determining
where everyone stands.”).
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illustration from Part I, the patent transferor (A) and the transferee (C) may not be
similarly situated (cross) licensees from the perspective of B. That is, C may be a
much larger company and as such B may have been able to gain much more from
granting a license to C as compared with A. And with respect to cross-licenses as
well, there is again the recurrent problem of apportionment if A transfers only some
of the relevant patents to C. These issues stem in part from the fact that patents are
rights to intangible property and so cannot adjoin another patent right in the way
that one tract of land can clearly adjoin another. These types of difficulties hinder
the smooth application to patents of the encumbrance theory apparently derived
from real property law.
How to explain then the holdings that royalties do not run with patents?
Under the encumbrance theory, the principle invoked by the courts – that patents
are personal property with which covenants cannot run – proves too much. This
principle would also seem to entirely prevent license rights from running with
patents, but it cannot be that the mere transfer of a patent wipes the patent clean of
all licenses. And so the courts have held; it “is a longstanding principle that an
assignee of a patent takes the patent subject to prior licenses.”106 Thus courts seem
to invoke the notion that covenants cannot run with personal property only
selectively and inconsistently, with no acknowledgement of the inconsistency and
no real guidance on when the principle should be invoked.
Unlike the encumbrance theory, the bundle theory provides a reconciliation
of the apparent realities that a covenant not to sue run with the patent but royalty
106

Innovus Prime, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93820, *15 (citing Keystone Type Foundry v.
Fastpress Co., 272 F. 242, 245 (2d Cir. 1921)).
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rights do not. The royalty right was never a part of the bundle of rights granted by
the USPTO. The patent is a bundle of rights to exclude.107 A patentee that grants a
license essentially sells one of the sticks in the bundle, the one that provides the
right to exclude the licensee. That stick is no longer in the bundle. Perhaps royalty
rights are received in exchange, but that does not make the royalty rights part of the
patent bundle. When the patent is transferred, what is transferred is the group of
sticks that remain in the bundle. Thus the transferee of the patent takes the patent
“diminished by the licensee’s right to use the patented process within the scope of
the license,”108 even though the transferee does not become a party to the license
agreement. The bundle theory thus accords with the principle that “the owner of a
patent cannot transfer an interest greater than that which it possesses.”109
The discussion of royalty rights highlights an important feature of the bundle
approach. Under the bundle approach, only the burdens of a license agreement may
run with the patent, the benefits do not run as a default matter, though a patent
transferor could agree to transfer them in the sale. The burdens run to the extent
that they are conceived of as a lessening of the bundle of patent rights. The benefits
cannot run, because a license agreement cannot add to the bundle of patent rights,
cannot make the patent more than the bundle of rights granted by the USPTO.

107

See n.42, supra.

108

L.L. Brown Paper Co. v. Hydroiloid, Inc., 118 F.2d 674, 677 (2d Cir. 1941).

109

Datatreasury, 522 F.3d at 1372; see also, Innovus Prime, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
93820, *15 (“Patent owners cannot transfer an interest greater than what they possess.”).
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Confidentiality Provisions

Contractual obligations to keep confidential the terms of a patent license
agreement have also been held not to bind subsequent owners of the licensed
patent. In Paice v. Hyundai, in the District of Maryland, the plaintiff, Paice, LLC, had
previously sued Toyota for infringement of certain patents, which litigation had
settled. Subsequently, Abell, a non-profit organization, became a co-owner of the
patents, which related to hybrid electric technology and fuel efficiency.110 Paice and
Abell then sued Hyundai on the same patents, and sought to disclose the PaiceToyota settlement agreement in the Hyundai litigation as evidence of reasonable
royalties for purposes of damages. Toyota intervened to prevent the disclosure of
the settlement agreement, invoking a confidentiality provision in the agreement,
which stated that the “terms of this Agreement are confidential and shall not be
disclosed unless required by law.”111 The court granted Toyota’s motion to prevent
disclosure of the settlement agreement with respect to Paice, but not with respect to
co-plaintiff Abell, because Abell was not a party to the settlement agreement.112
Applying Datatreasury, the Paice court held that the confidentiality provision
did not run with the patents, because it was “clearly a procedural term unrelated to
the right to use Paice’s (and now Abell’s) patents.”113 Toyota argued that “use”

110

Paice LLC v. Hyundai Motor Co., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15425, *2-3 (D. Md. Oct.
29, 2014)
111

Id. at *9.

112

Id. at *11.

113

Paice, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95042, *33 (magistrate memorandum opinion).
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within the meaning of Datatreasury “contemplates use of the license agreement in a
patent infringement trial,” but the court disagreed.114 The court recognized the
“potential problem” of “a patent owner, in bad faith, transferring interest in the
patent for the sole purpose of circumventing a confidentiality provision,” but noted
that this problem did not apply in the present case and that “a future court may
create an exception” for such a situation.115
Applying the bundle theory, the confidentiality provision is an in personam
agreement between the two signatories to the contract. It cannot prevent third
parties from attempting to compel disclosure of the agreement. There is no sense in
which confidentiality obligations can be though of as changing the bundle of patent
rights. Thus the holding of Paice that confidentiality provisions are generally not
binding on patent transferees can be explained under either theory.
D.

Termination

The power to terminate the license presents some more difficult questions.
At common law, if a lease gives a landowner the right to terminate the lease, that
benefit would generally run with the land.116 This would seem to be the case under
the encumbrance theory as well, as it seems that the right to terminate the license
(and thus use the patent unencumbered by the license) relates to the “actual use” of

114

Id.

115

2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154254, at *17-18.

116

Berger, 55 MINN. L. REV. at 233 (“it has been held that the benefit of a covenant
allowing the landowner to terminate the lease under certain described conditions runs to
the landlord’s successor in interest”).
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the patent. But there are good reasons why a termination right should not run.
Presumably, the thing stopping the patent owner from exercising the right to
terminate is the benefit (e.g., royalty rights or cross-license rights) that the patent
owner is receiving under the license agreement, which would cease upon
termination. If these benefits do not run with the patent, then there would be
nothing stopping a subsequent patent owner from exercising the right to terminate.
Thus if termination power runs with the patent, this could effectively eviscerate the
general rule that patent assignees must respect pre-existing licenses. Note that this
problem does not exist in the land situation because the tenant would be paying
rent to the new owner of the land.117
On the other hand, if the power to terminate the license does not run, then
transfer of the patent would seem to convert a terminable license to an interminable
one. This might initially seem problematic, but it makes sense if the Power to
terminate is viewed as a Power to terminate the entire license agreement, rather
than only the license to one patent. The licensee thus has a Liability to termination
of the entire contract. This explanation comports with the bundle theory; the Power
to terminate is a feature of the contract, which remains between the original two
parties, it does not affect the bundle of patent rights. The Power to terminate arises
from the license agreement, as the Power was not part of the bundle granted by the
USPTO. Under the bundle theory, the license agreement cannot add the termination
power to the patent bundle. Thus termination is another instance where the bundle
theory is more coherent than the encumbrance theory.
117

Id. at 222.
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LOT Revisited

This article now returns to the LOT agreement discussed in the introduction.
The LOT is an agreement entered into by a group of companies which is supposed to
prevent any of them from transferring their patents to a patent troll, or Patent
Assertion Entity, by granting a license which becomes effective only upon transfer of
the patent to a troll.
Section 1.1 of the LOT agreement – License Grant and Release – provides to
every Licensee a “fully vested and irrevocable” “license to make, have made . . . at
any time on or after any Transfer of the respective Subject Patent to an Assertion
Entity.”118 Section 1.2 states: “With respect to each Subject Patent of the Licensor,
the License constitutes a present, fully vested and irrevocable (except as provided in
Section 2 below) waiver of the right under the respective Subject Patent for any
Assertion Entity to make any Patent Assertion of the respective Subject Patent
against any Licensee . . . .”119 Thus section 1.2 is structured as a “present” waiver.
But what exactly is being presently waived? It is the potential future right of an
“Assertion Entity” – not a party to the agreement - to enforce the patent.
A paper by one of the LOT founders implies that the LOT is an encumbrance
that runs with the patent, though the paper contains no analysis on this point.120

118

LOT Agreement v2-0-11_24_15, at § 1.1, available at http://lotnet.com/download-lotagreement (accessed Dec. 2016).
119

Id. at § 1.2.

120

C. Eric Schulman, How Scalable Private-Ordering Solutions Improve IP Law:
Lessons Learned from my Founding of the License On Transfer (LOT) Network, available
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But it cannot be that the entire LOT agreement is an encumbrance, as it contains
many provisions not directly related to the actual use of the patent, including
provisions relating to withdrawl, bankruptcy, third party beneficiaries, costs,
governing law, and other issues.121
The LOT agreement also attempts to declare that:
All Licenses granted in this Agreement are intended to and shall run
with the Subject Patents to which they pertain for the full duration of
such Subject Patents and be binding on subsequent owners and
licensees. Any transfer or grant of rights in or to a Licensor’s Subject
Patent(s), whether by such Licensor or any subsequent transferee,
shall be subject to the Licenses and continuing obligations of this
Agreement with respect to such Subject Patent(s).122
But the enforceability of this provision is questionable, at least in certain
situations. If a PAE (“Patent Assertion Entity”) were to purchase one of the patents
in question, the PAE would not be a party to the LOT agreement. One cannot be
bound by a contract to which one is not a party.123 Significant information costs
would be imposed if a patent buyer could be bound (potentially without notice) by
the complex provisions of any license agreement entered into by any prior owner.124

at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2827904 (accessed Dec. 2016) (“This structure protects LOT
members from being attacked when a PAE acquires a LOT-encumbered patent.”).
121

See LOT Agreement v2-0-11_24_15, at § 2.3, 5.3, 5.5, 5.6, 5.11, available at
http://lotnet.com/download-lot-agreement (accessed Dec. 2016).
122

LOT Agreement at § 1.5.

123

See n.9, supra.

124

Merrill & Smith, 101 COLUM. L. REV. at 793 (“The unique advantage of in rem rights
– the strategy of exclusion – is that they conserve on information costs relative to in
personam rights in situations where the number of potential claimants to resources is
large, and the resource in question can be defined at relatively low cost.”).
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Even under the encumbrance theory, problematic situations could arise. The
license of Section 1.1 becomes active upon “Transfer” to an “Assertion Entity,” as
noted above. Section 6.18 of the agreement defines Transfer to Assertion Entity as:
“(i) the assignment, sale, exclusive license, or transfer, in whole or in
part, of such Patent to an Assertion Entity, whether by Licensor or any
subsequent transferee or exclusive licensee of the Subject Patent, or (ii)
acquisition of ownership or control of the Subject Patent by an
Assertion Entity (including any circumstance in which Licensor or any
subsequent transferee owning or controlling the Subject Patent is or
becomes an Assertion Entity . . .), with the earliest date any Entity
owning or controlling such Patent is or becomes an Assertion Entity or
Controlled by an Assertion Entity being deemed to be the effective
date of such Transfer.”125
Thus even if a patent is initially transferred to a regular operating company
that is not a party to the LOT, if that company then transfers the patent to an
Assertion Entity (or becomes an Assertion Entity), the LOT license is supposedly
activated. Assertion Entity is defined in section 6.2 as “an Entity and each one of its
Affiliates if such Entity and all of its Affiliates collectively derived from Patent
Assertion more than half of their total consolidated gross revenue measured over
the full twelve (12) months preceding a particular date . . . .”126 As such, in order for
the LOT to be fully enforceable, the definitions of Transfer and of Assertion Entity
must be part of the “encumbrance” that “runs with the patent.” But it is certainly
questionable whether these complex definitions relate to the “actual use of the
patent” (or use of the patented product) any more than the arbitration clause that

125

LOT Agreement § 6.18 (emphasis added).

126

LOT Agreement § 6.2.
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the Federal Circuit held not to run with the patent in Datatreasury, or the royalty
rights and confidentiality provisions that have also been held not to run.127
Application of the bundle theory to the LOT further highlights the problem.
Something like the LOT could potentially be conceptualized under the bundle theory
as a license granted immediately prior to transfer. Using the bundle theory, the LOT
member could give up the sticks corresponding to the rights to exclude the other
LOT members immediately prior to transferring the patent to a PAE, and the PAE
would thus receive a diminished bundle of sticks without the rights to exclude the
LOT members. This would be in some accord with the LOT’s name; a license
granted “on” (or immediately prior to) the transfer of a patent from a LOT member.
But the problem for the LOT is that the agreement is not actually structured
this way; it purports to also apply even where the patent is not transferred directly
from a LOT member to a PAE. For example where the patent is first transferred to a
non-LOT operating company, which then transfers it to a PAE, the full bundle must
be transferred to the non-LOT operating company, and then the bundle must
somehow be diminished upon transfer from the non-LOT operating company to the
PAE, even if neither is a party to the LOT.128 Similarly, if the patent is transferred to
a non-LOT operating company, which then becomes a PAE, the bundle must
somehow be diminished at the moment the company turns into a PAE (as defined by
the LOT) even though the company is not a party to the LOT.

127

See Part II(A), supra (discussing Datatreasury, 522 F.3d 1372); Part II(B)-(C), supra.

128

See LOT Agreement § 6.18, 6.2.
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Furthermore, section 1.2 purports to presently waive the “right under the
respective Subject Patent for any Assertion Entity to make any Patent Assertion of
the respective Subject Patent against any Licensee. . . .”129 But can a patent owner
waive the right of someone else to assert the patent? This would conceptually
require multiplying the bundle of patent rights to include the inchoate rights of
anyone who might potentially later own the patent, which would seem to be a
convoluted and problematic notion of property. A patent is more coherently
thought of as a bundle of rights to exclude, owned by whoever owns the patent.
The enforceability of the LOT is thus questionable, and could impose
significant information costs on downstream acquirers of the patent, particularly
where the patent is not transferred directly from a LOT member to a PAE. One of
the LOT founders apparently likens the LOT to an Open Source copyright license.130
In the case of an Open Source license, users are granted a license free of charge
provided they agree to the terms of the license.131 But this does not involve a
transfer of the copyright or terms of the license agreement running with such a
transfer. The LOT presents the different question of attempting to bind future
patent acquirers to the complex terms of a contract to which they have not agreed.

129

LOT Agreement § 1.2.

130

Schulman, supra at *1 (“Open Source is one example of a POS in the copyright
context. This paper uses the License On Transfer (LOT) Network (the largest networked
patent cross license by number of patents) as a case study of a POS.”).
131

See, e.g., Jacobsen v. Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“By requiring that
users copy and restate the license and attribution information, a copyright holder can
ensure that recipients of the redistributed computer code know the identity of the owner
as well as the scope of the license granted by the original owner.”).
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To be sure, the terms of the original license agreement are generally
important to the new patent owner to the extent that they altered the rights in the
patent bundle. For example, a patentee, through a license agreement, might agree
not only to refrain from suing the licensee, but also to refrain from suing the
licensee’s customers.132 In such a case, the bundle is diminished by not only the
stick corresponding to right to exclude the licensee, but also by the sticks
corresponding to the rights to exclude the licensee’s customers. Thus under the
bundle metaphor, the patent transferee would not have a right to exclude the
licensee’s customers, as the patent transferor gave up those rights and so could not
have transferred them. But it is important to remember that the subsequent patent
owner still is not a party to the contracts agreed to by prior owners of the patent. It
is one thing to diminish the patent bundle by giving up the rights to exclude certain
other entities. It is another thing for a patent owner to purport to give up the rights
of others who might potentially own the patent in the future, while keeping those
rights for itself in the present.

Part III – Broader Implications
The bundle theory and the encumbrance theory are different ways of
thinking about the effect of patent transfer on aspects of license agreements.
Sometimes these different theories lead to significantly different results. Having
determined that the bundle theory more elegantly and coherently explains the
132

See, e.g., Ericsson Inc. v. Wi-LAN USA, Inc., No. 14-21854-CV-DMM, D.I. 165, *3
(S.D. Fla., Aug. 14, 2015) (“Ericsson maintains that pursuant to the Siemens License,
LME and Siemens provided each other, their related companies, and their customers with
protection from the other’s patents.”).
43

Andrew C. Michaels

Patent Transfer

DRAFT – Dec. 2016

license on transfer situation, this article now explores the application of the bundle
theory to other areas of patent law.
Various doctrines in patent law deal with the alteration of patent rights due
to actions by the patentee or others interacting with the patent.133 As it is with
patent licenses, the bundle theory can be useful in conceptualizing the extent to
which such alterations travel with the patent upon its transfer. First discussed will
be patent exhaustion, then FRAND obligations, prior user rights, and finally laches.
A.

Patent Exhaustion

The Federal Circuit en banc majority opinion in Lexmark Int’l v. Impression
Products, included an application of the bundle of sticks conception in the area of patent
exhaustion.134 The plaintiff, Lexmark, made and sold printers as well as toner cartridges,
and owned a number of patents covering the cartridges and their use. The relevant
cartridges were sold domestically and at a discount but subject to an express singleuse/no-resale restriction. The defendant, Impression, later acquired the cartridges, not
directly from Lexmark, but rather after a third party had physically modified them so as
to enable re-use, in violation of the restriction. Impression then resold the cartridges, and
Lexmark sued for patent infringement. Impression attempted to defend under the
doctrine of patent exhaustion, arguing that by selling the cartridges, Lexmark had

133

Cf. Jason Rantanen, The Malleability of Patent Rights, 2015 MICH. ST. L. REV. 895,
919 (2016) (“[W]hen I say that patent rights are malleable, I mean that their scope and
strength can be altered by actors interacting with those rights even after the government
has issued that right.”).
134

Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Impression Prods., 816 F.3d 721 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (en banc),
certiorari granted (Dec. 2, 2016).
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exhausted its patent rights in those cartridges and could no longer sue for infringement.
The en banc majority however found no exhaustion, and in so holding, noted that it “has
long been a familiar feature of our legal landscape that property rights in a particular
thing – like the separate interests in making, selling, using, etc., an invention – are viewed
as a ‘bundle’ of rights (or sticks) that can generally be transferred separately.”135
The Lexmark dissent, however, was of the view that an authorized sale of a
patented article exhausts the patentee’s property rights in that article, regardless of any
contractual conditions placed on the sale.136 The Supreme Court recently granted
certiorari in the case, so it is possible that the dissent’s view might ultimately prevail. In
urging the Supreme Court to grant the petition for certiorari, the U.S. Solicitor General
argued in part that the Federal Circuit majority had been guilty of a “failure to distinguish
between the rights which are given to the inventor by the patent law and which he may
assert against the world through an infringement proceeding and rights which he may
create for himself by private contract.”137
The distinction drawn by the government is not unlike the distinction between the
license agreement and its effect on the underlying patent rights, precisely the sort of the
distinction that Hohfeld’s framework can help to flesh out.138 Normally, a patentee

135

Lexmark, 816 F.3d at 741.
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Lexmark, 816 F.3d at 781 (Dyk J., dissenting) (“The right to exclude expires (or is
‘exhausted’) by an authorized sale.”).
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Impression Prods., Inc., v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., No. 15-1189, Brief For The United
States As Amicus Curiae, at *8 (Oct. 2016) (quoting Motion Picture Patents Co. v.
Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 514 (1917)).
138

See Part I(C), supra.
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making an unrestricted sale of a patented article would be giving up the Right to exclude
with respect to that article. Whoever owns that article has a Privilege (or “authority”) to
infringe the patent with that article.139 This Privilege would be unaffected by any
subsequent transfer of the patent, because the patent owner would transfer the bundle of
patent rights appropriately diminished, including the “No Rights” correlative to the
Privileges of those who had purchased patented articles from the previous patentee. But
according to the Federal Circuit majority in Lexmark, when a patentee explicitly places
conditions on the sale (e.g., single use, no resale), the patentee is only giving up the Right
to exclude provided that the article is used in accordance with those conditions. Thus the
patent bundle is diminished to a lesser extent than it would be in the case of an
unrestricted sale of a patented article.
The question then is whether restrictions placed on an authorized sale should be
allowed to lessen the extent to which a patentee parts with its in rem patent rights in the
article sold, or whether such restrictions are mere in personam agreements between the
buyer and the seller. One advantage of the bright line rule urged by the Solicitor General
and by the dissent would be lower information costs on downstream purchasers of
patented articles.140

139

Id. at 734 (“some sales confer authority on the purchaser to take certain actions – such
as selling or using the purchased article in the United States or importing it into the
United States – that would otherwise be infringing acts”).
140

See Part I(B), supra. See also, Lexmark, 816 F.3d at 781 (Dyk J., dissenting) (“Postsale restraints would ‘cast a cloud of uncertainty over every sale.’”) (quoting Tessera, Inc.
v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 646 F.3d 1357, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2011)); Brief For The United
States, supra, at *14 (“This Court long ago recognized that ‘[t]he inconvenience and
annoyance to the public’ if patent rights are not exhausted by the first authorized sale are
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On the other hand, the Lexmark case also seems to raise what J.E. Penner called
“the question of individuation,” that is, can property be divided any which way (like
slicing a cake) or is it comprised of certain indivisible base units (like a club is comprised
of individual people).141 Penner seemed to think that property should be viewed as more
like the cake.142 The Lexmark majority would allow patentees to control the extent to
which they part with their patent rights upon sale, whereas the dissent takes more of an
individuated, all or nothing approach to sales of patented articles.
B.

FRAND Commitments

Technology companies sometimes seek to have their patented inventions
incorporated into the guidelines promulgated by standard setting organizations
(SSOs). In doing so, such comapanies promise that if their invention is adopted into
the standard, they will license the patent rights on fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory (FRAND) terms to anyone who infringes due to compliance with the
standard. But what happens if the company that made the FRAND commitment
then transfers the patent? Is the subsequent patent owner bound by the FRAND
commitment? For much the same reasons that subsequent patent owners are
generally held to be bound by bare license commitments, it seems that the answer
should be yes. As Jay Kesan and Carol Hayes explain, “if a patentee could extinguish
‘too obvious to require illustration.’”) (quoting Keeler v. Standard Folding Bed Co., 157
U.S. 659, 667 (1895)).
141

J.E. Penner, 43 UCLA L. REV. at 754.

142

Id. (“If we are to take the bundle of rights analysis of property seriously we have to
believe that the individual rights are like members of a club . . . . However, as the
analysis will show, they are merely like slices of a cake, no more than momentary
functional descriptions made with a particular legal concern in mind.”).
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the benefits of a FRAND commitment by transferring the patent to a third party, this
would lead to inequitable results.”143
That is, if an SSO were induced by a FRAND commitment to adopt a
particular invention into the standard, it would be inequitable if the FRAND
commitment could then be shirked through a transfer of the patent. But as with
patent licenses, there is some uncertainty as to the theory or mechanism by which a
subsequent patent owner would be bound by a previous owner’s FRAND
commitment. Kesan and Hayes primarily adopt the encumbrance theory, arguing in
favor of “conceptualiz[ing] the FRAND commitment as an encumbrance that runs
with the patent, similar to a servitude under real property law.”144 They explain that
it is “fairly uncontroversial to conclude that a FRAND commitment relates to the use
of the patent,” and moreover, that subsequent owners should be considered to be on
notice because the standards documents are publicly available, and “many SSOs also
make FRAND commitments publicly available.”145 They note that the “primary
hurdle to analogizing to servitudes is that patents are treated as having the
attributes of personal property, and servitudes on personal property are generally
disfavored in the law,” but sidestep this hurdle by pointing out that the “law of
servitudes has become more liberalized over the years.”146
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Jay Kesan & Carol M. Hayes, FRAND’s Forever: Standards, Patent Transfers, and
Licensing Commitments, 89 IND. L. J. 231, 304 (2014).
144

Kesan & Hayes, 89 IND. L. J. at 313.
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Id. at 295.
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Id.
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The encumbrance theory is better suited for FRAND commitments than it is
for patent licenses. The reason is that practically the entire FRAND commitment
relates to the patent, so it is relatively unproblematic to think of the entire FRAND
commitment as running with the patent. By contrast, as discussed earlier, license
privileges often arise from broad license agreements with many different types of in
personam commitments. There may be many different patents involved in a license
agreement and many different types of commitments, not all of which will be
directly related to any one patent. Accordingly, it would not make sense to have the
entire license agreement shift to a new party with the transfer of one patent.
But the FRAND commitment could also be conceptualized using the bundle
approach. The patent owner trades certain aspects of the bundle of rights in
exchange for adoption of the invention into the standard. The FRAND commitment
can be said to qualify the right to exclude with respect to those who use the
standard, in that “the patent owner cannot play the patent holdout game,”147 that is,
a patent owner seeking to enforce must be willing to negotiate a FRAND license with
the potential infringer. And the bundle theory does still accord better with the
treatment of patents as personal property and the law’s disfavoring of servitudes on
personal property. Thus although the encumbrance theory is relatively
unproblematic for FRAND commitments, the bundle theory more coherently
conceptualizes such constraints.
Indeed, Kesan and Hayes also attempt to apply Hohfeld to the FRAND
scenario, albeit in a different manner, stating that the “FRAND commitment may be
147

Id. at 297.
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understood as imposing on the patent owner a duty to negotiate in good faith, and
through a Hohfeldian analysis, this means that there is a correlative right to good
faith negotiation that is held by the potential licensee.”148 If such a duty travels with
the patent, this would mean that all potential infringers would have an affirmative
claim (e.g., breach of contract) against a subsequent patentee who did not comply
with the duty to negotiate in good faith. This seems questionable. For support,
Kesan and Hayes cite Apple v. Samsung, where the court stated that under French
law, “Samsung’s contractual obligations arising from its FRAND declarations to ETSI
at the very least created a duty to negotiate in good faith with Apple regarding
FRAND terms.”149 But that case did not involve a patent transfer, Samsung was the
plaintiff and the party that made the commitment to the SSO (ETSI). Samsung thus
had a duty to comply with its own contractual obligations, but that does not mean
that such contractual obligations necessarily entirely travel with the patent.
The FRAND commitment can be better conceptualized as the patentee giving
up or qualifying its Rights to exclude, instead of as creating affirmative Rights in
each of the SSO members. Thus the SSO members have a Privilege to a negotiated
license on FRAND terms, rather than a Right to negotiation. The important thing to
the SSO members is not negotiation for its own sake, rather it is freedom from
holdout pressure. The Privilege is not an affirmative claim, but if a subsequent
patent owner attempts to “play the holdout game” or sue an SSO member without

148

Id. at 290.

149

Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., No. 11-CV-01846, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
67201, *43-44 (N.D. Cal. May 14, 2012).
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negotiating, the SSO member may invoke the Privilege as a defense, thereby
relieving the SSO member of holdout pressure. As such, the FRAND obligations on
patent owners are better thought of as No Rights instead of Duties, as the patent
owner has no right to play the holdout game. The bundle of patent rights is thus
diminished, and only the diminished bundle would transfer to a subsequent owner.
C.

Prior User Rights

Although it is generally accepted that a patent provides only a right to
exclude and not a right to use,150 some use rights may arise irrespective of the
patent by virtue of invention or prior use. The Supreme Court has stated that the
right of an inventor to use its own creation “existed before and without the passage
of law and was always the right of an inventor.”151 As explained in the classic text
book by Albert H. Walker:
A patentee has two kinds of rights in his invention. He has a right to
make, use, and sell specimens of the invented thing; and he has a right
to prevent all other persons from doing either of those acts. The first
of these rights is wholly independent of the patent laws; while the
second exists by virtue of those laws alone.152

150

See, e.g., 5 DONALD S. CHISUM, supra, § 16.02[1]; Bio-Tech. Gen. Corp., 80 F.3d at
1559. But see, Adam Mossoff, Exclusion and Exclusive Use in Patent Law, 22 HARV. J.
L. & TECH. 321 (2009).
151

Bauer & Cie v. O’Donnell, 229 U.S. 1, 10 (1913); see also Pennock v. Dialogue, 27
U.S. 1, 23 (1829) (explaining that the Patent Act of 1800 “may well be deemed merely
affirmative of what would be the result from general principles of law,” in that it “gives
the right to the first and true inventor and to him only”).
152

ALBERT H. WALKER, TEXT BOOK OF THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS, § 155,
pg. 193 (5th ed. 1917) (citing Bloomer v. McQuewan, 14 How. 539 (1852); United States
v. Bell Telephone Co., 197 U.S. 238 (1897); Jewett v. Atwood Suspender Co., 100 F.R.
647 (1900); Victor Talking Mach. Co. v. The Fair, 123 F.R. 426 (1903)).
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Similarly, William C. Robinson stated:
The right conferred by the grant of letters-patents is the right to the
exclusive use of the invention during a specific period of time. This
right differs, in some respects, from the right to the invention itself.
The right to the invention vests in an the inventor by virtue of his own
creative act, and under existing laws includes the right not only to use
it without a patent, but to obtain a patent for it . . . . The right created
by the letters-patent is collateral to the right to the invention . . . .153
Given that subsequent independent creation is not a modern day defense to a
claim of patent infringement, it seems that the inventor’s independent use right is
no longer in full effect.154 But the notion of use rights for inventors carries forward
to present day patent law to some extent in the form of prior user rights. The
America Invents Act provides a defense to infringement “based on prior commercial
use.”155 Prior to the AIA, a “prior user who did not abandon, suppress, or conceal
the invention,” could rely on Section 102(g)(2) to “invalidate the later patent of
another and thereby escape liability for infringement.”156 But with the AIA’s switch
to a first-to-file patent system, it was necessary to enact the full prior commercial

153

WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, 2 THE LAW OF PATENTS 6-7, § 420 (1890).

154

See, e.g., Smith, 116 YALE L. J. at 1810 (“Patent law, but not copyright law, gives a
right against independent invention or creation . . . .”).
155

35 U.S.C. § 273 (2013).

156

See U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., REPORT ON THE PRIOR USER RIGHTS DEFENSE 48
(2012); 35 U.S.C. § 102(g)(2), amended by Leahy-Smith American Invents Act of 2011,
Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284.
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use defense in order to ensure that prior users could not be forced to pay for the
continued use of their own prior work.157
If use rights inhere by virtue of invention and are separate from the patent,
they should not travel with the patent. Practicing one patent (A) might require the
practice of another blocking patent (B). The inventor of patent A might have a prior
user right to practice patent B. But the prior user right is not granted by the USPTO,
it is separate from the patent. That is, the inventor of patent A would have had the
prior user right with respect to patent B even if she had never applied for patent A.
Prior user rights are personal to the prior user, they are in personam. Thus the prior
user rights are not part of the bundle of patent rights, and would not travel to a new
patent owner upon transfer of the patent.
D.

Laches

Laches is an equitable defense with a long common law pedigree, wherein
courts of equity “refused its aid to stale demands, where the party has slept upon his
right and acquiesced for a great length of time.”158 To invoke the defense of laches
in a patent case, the defendant must prove: (1) an unreasonable delay in filing suit
by the patentee, and (2) that the delay operated to prejudice the accused

157

U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., at 48 (“The switch from first-to-invent to firstinventor-to-file is cited in the legislative history of the AIA as the main impetus behind
the changes to section 273. (footnote omitted) One of the direct results of adopting a firstinventor-to-file regime is the elimination of section 102(g)(2) of the current law.”).
158

See, e.g., Smith v. Clay, 3 Brown Ch. 638, 29 Eng. Reg. 743 (1767).
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infringer.159 An example of prejudice would be where if the defendant had notice, it
could have switched to a non-infringing product.160 While laches bars retrospective
relief, it as a general matter does not bar prospective relief.161
Part of the purpose of the laches doctrine is to prevent trolls from lurking
under bridges until the most opportune time to emerge. A hiding troll might induce
a billy goat to invest in walking towards a certain bridge.162 If the troll had been
standing on top of the bridge, the billy goat might have found a different way up the
hillside. A patent troll might similarly lie in wait, deliberately allowing a technology
company to accrue infringement damages, whereas if the troll had made its patent
known, the company might have switched to a non-infringing alternative. The
Supreme Court is currently considering whether laches remains a defense in patent

159

See, e.g., A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Const. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1032 (Fed.
Cir. 1992) (en banc).
160

See Auckerman, 960 F.2d at 1033; Meyers, 912 F.2d at 1463 (reversing summary
judgment of laches because the evidence indicated that the accused infringer would have
continued its development and sales activities regardless of what the patentee did).
161

Auckerman, 960 F.2d at 1040, 1043. See also, 6A-19 CHISUM ON PATENTS § 19.05
[3][a](“In terms of the effect on the patent owner’s rights, laches precludes the recovery
of damages for infringements occurring prior to the filing of suit but not an injunction or
damages as to post-filing infringements; estoppel bars prospective as well as
retrospective relief.”); SCA Hygiene Prods. v. First Quality Baby Prods., 807 F.3d 1311,
1333 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc) (“[A] patentee guilty of laches typically does not
surrender its right to an ongoing royalty.”), certiorari granted, 136 S. Ct. 1824 (2016).
162

See n.4, supra.
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litigation.163 If laches is done away with, patent trolls will be free to hide under
technological bridges with impunity.164
When a patent is transferred, the prior owner’s knowledge of infringing
activities is constructively imputed to the new owner.165 As the Federal Circuit has
explained, a “patentee cannot avoid the consequences of his laches by transferring
the patent.”166 Thus to the extent that potential infringers have a viable laches
defense to a particular patent, that defense would remain if the patent were
transferred. As such, the laches defense should be thought of as altering the in rem
patent rights rather than as an in personam defense against a particular patentee.167
Applying Hohfeld, the laches defense is a Privilege to infringe without paying
retrospective damages.168 The patentee thus has a No Right to retrospective
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SCA Hygiene, 136 S. Ct. 1824 (argued Nov. 1, 2016) (considering whether laches
should be available to bar claims for legal damages from patent infringement that are
brought within the six-year limitations period codified at 35 U.S.C. § 286).
164

See, e.g., SCA Hygiene Prods. v. First Quality Baby Prods., No. 15-927, Amicus Brief
Of Dell, 5 (Sept. 19, 2016) (“NPEs tend to wait to sue, allowing others to build up
businesses and then claiming a share of the profits (or a payment to go away).”).
165
See CHISUM, at [2][a][ii] (“It is well-settled that in determining the length of delay, a
transferee of the patent must accept the consequences of the dilatory conduct of
immediate and remote transferors. This includes any charges of infringement or threats
of suit made by a predecessor.”).
166

Eastman Kodak Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 114 F.3d 1547, 1559 (Fed. Cir.
1997). See also, Barnes & Noble, Inc. v. LSI Corp., 849 F. Supp. 2d 925, 931 (N.D. Cal.
2012) (“Lucent’s conduct may be imputed to Defendants for at least some theories of
unenforceability of patent rights, including laches, estoppel, and inequitable conduct.”).
167

See Rantanen, supra, 2015 MICH. ST. L. REV. at 919.

168

Cf., SCA Hygiene, 807 F.3d at 1332 (“Equitable estoppel, on the other hand, is
different – the patentee has granted a license to use the invention that extends throughout
the life of the patent.”).
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damages (or only a prospective Right to exclude) against any defendant with a bona
fide laches defense. Conduct giving rise to a laches defense, then, diminishes the
bundle of patent rights. When the patent is transferred, under the theory of this
article, the transferor takes only the diminished bundle of rights.

Conclusion
Devices or conceptualizations can provide a way of understanding the law in
a more coherent way, thereby reducing uncertainty in the law and improving the
ability to accurately predict how the law will or should treat situations that might
arise in the future. One example of a conceptualization in patent law is the classic
“Winslow tableau” device for thinking about obviousness, which is to “picture the
inventor as working in his shop with the prior art references—which he is
presumed to know—hanging on the walls around him.”169 This device may not
work perfectly in every case, but it can be a useful way of thinking about most cases.
The power of Newtonian Physics to predict reality is known to break down at the
quantum and relativistic levels, but nevertheless it provides a useful model for most
standard earthly activities.
The bundle theory provides a useful framework for thinking about a variety
of doctrines in patent law. Under this theory, the patent is a bundle of rights (or
sticks) granted by the USPTO. Actions by the owner of a patent, such as entering
into a license agreement, selling a patented article, or making FRAND commitments,
can diminish this bundle of rights, but cannot add to it. The owner of a patent can
169

In re Winslow, 53 C.C.P.A. 1574, 1577 (C.C.P.A. 1966) (Rich, J.).
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exchange sticks in the bundle for other forms of value. When a patent is transferred,
what is transferred is whatever remains in the bundle. That is, the transferred
patent is the original bundle of sticks granted by the USPTO, but appropriately
diminished by the actions of the previous patent owners.
Regarding the effect of patent transfer on patent licenses, the bundle theory
provides a framework that is more consistent and helpful than the prevalent
encumbrance theory. And although it does not purport to be the unifying theory of
patent law, the bundle theory can provide a useful way of thinking about some other
doctrines in patent law as well. Courts and litigators then, should consider making
use of the bundle framework, especially when faced with issues arising from or
related to the transfer of patents.
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